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1 Introduction
Pakes & McGuire (1994) develop a dynamic quality ladder model in the Markov perfect
equilibrium framework of Ericson & Pakes (1995). In the Pakes & McGuire (1994) model,
forward-looking oligopolistic ﬁrms compete with each other in the product market and
through their investment, entry, and exit decisions. By investing in the present a ﬁrm
hopes to increase the quality of its product–and ultimately its proﬁts from product market
competition–in the future. Investment, entry, and exit decisions are thus both dynamic and
strategic.
The Pakes & McGuire (1994) model has been widely used as a template for dynamic
models of investment in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework. It has been adapted to
study mergers (Gowrisankaran 1999, Gowrisankaran & Holmes 2004); capacity accumula-
tion (Besanko & Doraszelski 2004, Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu & Satterthwaite 2008); com-
petitive convergence (Langohr 2004); advertising (Doraszelski & Markovich 2007, Dube´,
Hitsch & Manchanda 2005); network eﬀects (Markovich 2008, Markovich & Moenius 2009,
Chen, Doraszelski & Harrington 2009); research joint ventures (Song 2008); durable goods
(Goettler & Gordon 2009); investment in both vertical and horizontal product diﬀerentia-
tion (Narajabad & Watson 2008); spillovers (Laincz & Rodrigues 2008); and the timing of
version releases (Borkovsky 2008). The Pakes & McGuire (1994) model has also been used
to benchmark algorithms for computing Markov perfect equilibria in the Ericson & Pakes
(1995) framework.1
Although widely used and adapted, the Pakes & McGuire (1994) model has never been
thoroughly investigated. First, Pakes & McGuire (1994) compute equilibria for just two
parameterizations, thus leaving the parameter space largely unexplored. Second, Pakes &
McGuire (1994) do not characterize the equilibrium behavior that arises and instead focus
on the eﬀects of diﬀerent institutional arrangements on market structure and welfare. Given
the model’s prominence, we feel it is important to better understand possible equilibrium
behaviors and how behavior changes as one moves through the parameter space.
In this paper we use the homotopy method to undertake a thorough exploration of the
equilibrium correspondence of a version of the Pakes & McGuire (1994) model with at
most two ﬁrms. The homotopy method was ﬁrst applied to dynamic stochastic games by
Besanko, Doraszelski, Kryukov & Satterthwaite (2009) (see also Borkovsky et al. 2008). It
is a type of path-following method. Starting from a single equilibrium that has already
been computed, it traces out an entire path in the equilibrium correspondence by varying
one or more selected parameters of the model. The homotopy method is thus ideally suited
to investigating the economic phenomena that arise as one moves through the parameter
space.
1See Pakes & McGuire (1994), Pakes & McGuire (2001), Ferris, Judd & Schmedders (2007), Doraszelski
& Judd (2008), Weintraub, Benkard & Van Roy (2008), Borkovsky, Doraszelski & Kryukov (2008), Farias,
Saure & Weintraub (2008), and Santos (2009).
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We ﬁnd that a change in parameterization that increases (decreases) the cost (bene-
ﬁt) of achieving/maintaining any given product quality yields more asymmetric industry
structures in the short and long run. The cost is tied to the rate of depreciation and the
eﬀectiveness of investment, and the beneﬁt is tied to the market size and the marginal cost
of production. Consider an increase in the rate of depreciation: A higher rate of depre-
ciation makes it more costly for a ﬁrm to achieve or maintain any given quality level for
its product. It thus makes it more costly for the follower to catch up with the leader and
thus stiﬄes the follower’s incentive to invest. Accordingly, the leadership position becomes
more secure. It follows that each ﬁrm strives to be the ﬁrst to gain a lead over its rival
and, thereafter, to induce its rival to cease investing and perhaps even exit, so that it can
ultimately achieve industry dominance.
In a recent paper, Snider (2008) studies predation in the airline industry by structurally
estimating a model of capacity accumulation similar to Besanko et al. (2008). He argues
that cost asymmetries amongst ﬁrms give rise to predatory investment. We ﬁnd that the
possibility of entry and exit in the Pakes & McGuire (1994) model alone gives rise to preda-
tory and limit investment. This ﬁnding suggests that such behaviors are quite pervasive
in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework, especially since the Pakes & McGuire (1994)
model is arguably the simplest model in this framework that one can devise. Interestingly,
we see predation occur in a complete information setting amongst symmetric ﬁrms whereas
in much of the earlier literature (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts 1982, Fudenberg & Tirole 1986)
predation occurs only in the face of asymmetric information and/or amongst asymmetric
ﬁrms.
A second and equally important advantage of the homotopy method is that it allows
us to systematically search for multiple equilibria. Multiple equilibria have long been a
concern in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework. They are problematic for at least two
reasons. First, most structural estimation methods for models in the Ericson & Pakes
(1995) framework such as Aguirregabiria & Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard & Levin (2007),
Pakes, Ostrovsky & Berry (2007), and Pesendorfer & Schmidt-Dengler (2008) depend on
the assumption that the same equilibrium is being played in all geographic markets and/or
time periods. While this assumption is trivially satisﬁed if the equilibrium is unique, it
has real bite in the presence of multiplicity. Second, it is diﬃcult to draw conclusions from
policy experiments if there are multiple equilibria, as one cannot determine which of them
arises after a change in policy. It is therefore important to more fully characterize the set
of equilibria in order to bound the range of outcomes that may be produced by the change
in policy.
To date, the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm has been used most often to solve
for Markov perfect equilibria in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework. Being a Gaussian
method, it cannot be used to systematically search for multiple equilibria; one can only take
the trial-and-error approach of starting the algorithm from diﬀerent points in the hope that
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it converges to diﬀerent equilibria. The Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm also suﬀers from
a more severe problem: Besanko et al. (2009) show that when there are multiple equilibria,
the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm is unable to compute a substantial fraction of them.
In other words, they show that these equilibria are not locally stable under the Pakes &
McGuire (1994) algorithm.
The homotopy method is an important step towards resolving these issues, as it allows us
to systematically search for multiplicity and to compute equilibria that are unstable under
the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm. Recall that the homotopy method traces out an
entire path in the equilibrium correspondence by varying one or more selected parameters
of the model. If this path bends back on itself, then the homotopy method has identiﬁed
multiple equilibria. The homotopy method is guaranteed to ﬁnd all equilibria on a path it
traverses and, therefore, to ﬁnd all multiple equilibria that arise in this manner. However,
since multiple equilibria for a given parameterization do not necessarily lie on the same
path, the homotopy method is not guaranteed to ﬁnd all equilibria.
Our systematic search reveals several instances of multiple equilibria, in contrast to
Pakes & McGuire’s (1994) conclusion that “[we have computed several of our examples . . .
from diﬀerent initial conditions, and we have always converged to the same ﬁxed point,
so nonuniqueness does not seem to be a problem with the simple functional forms we
are currently using” (p. 570). In a companion paper (Borkovsky et al. 2008), we have
explored the equilibrium correspondence of the quality ladder model without entry and
exit. Interestingly, in the current model multiple equilibria arise for parameterizations for
which we did not ﬁnd multiple equilibria in the model without entry and exit. This suggests
that entry and exit can by themselves be a source of multiplicity in the Ericson & Pakes
(1995) framework.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the Pakes & McGuire (1994)
model. In section 3, we brieﬂy discuss the theory of the homotopy method as well as
HOMPACK90, a suite of Fortran90 routines developed by Watson, Sosonkina, Melville,
Morgan & Walker (1997) that implements this method. We then explain how we use
HOMPACK90 to compute equilibria of the quality ladder model. Section 4 describes the
diﬀerent types of equilibrium behavior that can arise and the associated industry dynamics.
In section 5, we show that entry and exit can give rise to predatory and limit investment.
In section 6, we describe instances of multiple equilibria that we have uncovered. Section 7
concludes.
2 Quality Ladder Model
We consider the quality ladder model of Pakes & McGuire (1994). The description of the
model is abridged; please see Pakes & McGuire (1994) for details. To simplify the exposition,
we restrict attention to a version of the model with at most two ﬁrms. To allow for entry
and exit in a way that guarantees the existence of an equilibrium, we follow Doraszelski &
4
Satterthwaite (2009) and assume that setup costs and scrap values are privately observed
random variables.
Firms and states. Firm n ∈ {1, 2} is described by its state ωn ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}. States
1, . . . ,M describe the product quality of a ﬁrm that is active in the product market, i.e., an
incumbent ﬁrm, while state 0 identiﬁes the ﬁrm as being inactive, i.e., a potential entrant.
We model exit as a transition from state ωn = 0 to ω′n = 0 and entry as a transition from
state ωn = 0 to state ω′n = 0. The vector of ﬁrms’ states is ω = (ω1, ω2) ∈ {0, . . . ,M}2 and
we use ω[2] to denote the vector (ω2, ω1) obtained by interchanging ﬁrms’ states.
Timing. In each period the sequence of events is as follows:
1. Incumbent ﬁrms learn their scrap value and decide on exit and investment. Potential
entrants learn their setup cost and decide on entry.
2. Incumbent ﬁrms compete in the product market.
3. Exit and entry decisions are implemented.
4. The investment decisions of the remaining incumbents are carried out and their un-
certain outcomes are realized. A common industry-wide depreciation shock aﬀecting
incumbents and entrants is realized.
Below we ﬁrst describe the static model of product market competition and then turn to
investment, entry, and exit dynamics.
Product market competition. The product market is characterized by price compe-
tition with vertically diﬀerentiated products. There is a continuum of consumers. Each
consumer purchases at most one unit of one product. The utility a consumer derives from
purchasing from ﬁrm n is g(ωn)− pn + n, where
g(ωn) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−∞ if ωn = 0,
ωn if 1 ≤ ωn ≤ ω∗,
ω∗ + ln (2− exp (ω∗ − ωn)) if ω∗ < ωn ≤ M,
(1)
maps the quality of the product into the consumer’s valuation of it, pn is the price, and n
represents the consumer’s idiosyncratic preference for product n. By setting g(0) = −∞, we
ensure that potential entrants have zero demand and thus do not compete in the product
market. There is an outside alternative, product 0, which has utility 0. Assuming that the
idiosyncratic preferences (0, 1, 2) are independently and identically type 1 extreme value
distributed, the demand for incumbent ﬁrm n’s product is
Dn(p;ω) = m
exp (g(ωn)− pn)
1 +
∑2
j=1 exp (g(ωj)− pj)
, (2)
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where p = (p1, p2) is the vector of prices and m > 0 is the size of the market (the measure
of consumers).
Incumbent ﬁrm n chooses the price pn of its product to maximize proﬁts. Hence,
incumbent ﬁrm n’s proﬁts in state ω are
πn(ω) = max
pn
Dn(pn, p−n(ω);ω) (pn − c) ,
where p−n(ω) is the price charged by the rival and c ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of produc-
tion. Given a state ω, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the product market game
(Caplin & Nalebuﬀ 1991). It is found easily by numerically solving the system of ﬁrst-
order conditions corresponding to incumbent ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximization problems. Note
that product market competition does not directly aﬀect state-to-state transitions. Hence,
πn(ω) can be computed before the Markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic stochastic game
are computed. This allows us to treat πn(ω) as a primitive in what follows.
Incumbent firms. Suppose ﬁrst that ﬁrm n is an incumbent ﬁrm, i.e., ωn = 0. We
assume that at the beginning of each period each incumbent ﬁrm draws a random scrap
value from a distribution F (·); in particular; we assume that scrap values are drawn from
a triangular distribution with support [φ¯ − , φ¯ + ]. Scrap values are independently and
identically distributed across ﬁrms and periods. Incumbent ﬁrm n learns its scrap value φn
prior to making its exit and investment decisions, but the scrap values of its rivals remain
unknown to it. If the scrap value is above a threshold φ˜n, then incumbent ﬁrm n exits
the industry and perishes; otherwise it remains in the industry. This decision rule can be
represented either with the cutoﬀ scrap value φ˜n itself or with the probability ξn ∈ [0, 1] that
incumbent ﬁrm n remains in the industry in state ω because ξn =
∫
1(φn ≤ φ˜n)dF (φn) =
F (φ˜n), where 1(·) is the indicator function, is equivalent to φ˜n = F−1(ξn).
If it remains in the industry, then the state of an incumbent ﬁrm in the next period
is determined by the stochastic outcomes of its investment decision and an industry-wide
depreciation shock which stems from an increase in the quality of the outside alternative.
In particular, incumbent ﬁrm n’s state evolves according to the law of motion
ω′n = ωn + τn − η,
where τn ∈ {0, 1} is a random variable governed by incumbent ﬁrm n’s investment xn ≥ 0
and η ∈ {0, 1} is an industry-wide depreciation shock. If τn = 1, the investment is successful
and the quality of incumbent ﬁrm n increases by one level. The probability of success is
αxn
1+αxn
, where α > 0 is a measure of the eﬀectiveness of investment. If η = 1, the industry
is hit by a depreciation shock and the qualities of all products decrease by one level; this
happens with probability δ ∈ [0, 1].
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Potential entrants. Suppose next that ﬁrm n is a potential entrant, i.e., ωn = 0. We
assume that at the beginning of each period each potential entrant draws a random setup
cost from a distribution F e(·); in particular, we assume that setup costs are drawn from
a triangular distribution with support [φ¯e − , φ¯e + ]. Like scrap values, setup costs are
independently and identically distributed across ﬁrms and periods, and its setup cost is
private to a ﬁrm. If the setup cost is below a threshold φ˜en, then potential entrant n
enters the industry; otherwise it perishes. This decision rule can be represented with the
probability ξn ∈ [0, 1] that potential entrant n enters in the industry.
Upon entry, a potential entrant undergoes a setup period. At the end of this period
(i.e., at the beginning at the next period) potential entrant n becomes incumbent ﬁrm n
and its state is
ω′n = ω
e − η,
where ωe is an exogenously given initial product quality.
Value and policy functions. Deﬁne Vn(ω) to be the expected net present value of ﬁrm
n’s cash ﬂows if the industry is currently in state ω. The incumbent’s value function is Vn :
{1, . . . ,M}×{0, . . . ,M} → R, and its policy functions ξn : {1, . . . ,M}×{0, . . . ,M} → [0, 1]
and xn : {1, . . . ,M} × {0, . . . ,M} → [0,∞) specify the probability that incumbent ﬁrm n
remains in the industry and its investment in state ω. The potential entrant’s value function
is Vn : {0}×{0, . . . ,M} → R, and its policy function ξn : {0}×{0, . . . ,M} → [0, 1] speciﬁes
the probability that potential entrant n enters the industry in state ω.2
Bellman equation and optimality conditions. Suppose ﬁrst that ﬁrm n is an incum-
bent ﬁrm, i.e., ωn = 0. The value function Vn : {1, . . . ,M} × {0, . . . ,M} → R is implicitly
deﬁned by the Bellman equation
Vn(ω) = max
ξn∈[0,1],xn≥0
πn(ω) + (1− ξn)E
{
φn|φn ≥ F−1(ξn)
}
+ξn
{
−xn + β
(
αxn
1 + αxn
W 1n(ω) +
1
1 + αxn
W 0n(ω)
)}
, (3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Note that an optimizing incumbent cares about the
expectation of the scrap value conditional on collecting it,
2We need not solve for the potential entrant’s value function because it does not enter any of the equations
below, aside from the one in which it is deﬁned. This is because an incumbent ﬁrm that exits perishes; i.e.,
it does not become a potential entrant. We include the potential entrant’s value function simply for the sake
of completeness. Also recall that an entrant does not invest in the period in which it enters.
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E
{
φn|φn ≥ F−1(ξn)
}
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ¯ if Tn = −1,
φ¯ + 
(
1−3Tn2−2Tn3
3(2−(1+Tn)2)
)
if −1 < Tn < 0,
φ¯ + 
(
1−3Tn2+2Tn3
3(1−Tn2)
)
if 0 ≤ Tn < 1,
φ¯ +  if Tn = 1,
where
Tn ≡ 1

[
F−1(ξn)− φ¯
] ∈ [0, 1] ,
rather than its unconditional expectation E(φn). W τnn (ω) is the expectation of incumbent
ﬁrm n’s value function conditional on an investment success (τn = 1) and failure (τn = 0),
respectively, as given by
W τnn (ω) =
∑
η∈{0,1}
δη(1− δ)1−η
[
1(ω−n = 0)ξ−n(ω)Vn
(
max {min {ωn + τn − η,M} , 1} , ωe − η
)
+1(ω−n > 0)
[
ξ−n(ω)
∑
τ−n∈{0,1}
(
αx−n(ω)
1+αx−n(ω)
)τ−n (
1
1+αx−n(ω)
)1−τ−n
×Vn
(
max {min {ωn + τn − η,M} , 1} ,max {min {ω−n + τ−n − η,M} , 1}
)]
+(1− ξ−n(ω))Vn
(
max {min {ωn + τn − η,M} , 1} , 0
)]
, (4)
where x−n(ω) is the investment of the rival in state ω and ξ−n(ω) is the probability that a
rival entrant (incumbent) enters (remains in) the industry in state ω. Note that the min
and max operators merely enforce the bounds of the state space.
Solving the maximization problem on the right-hand side of the Bellman equation (3)
and using the fact that (1 − ξn)E
{
φn|φn ≥ F−1(ξn)
}
=
∫
φn≥F−1(ξn) φndF (φn), we obtain
the ﬁrst-order condition for ξn(ω):
− F−1(ξn(ω)) +
{
−xn + β
(
αxn
1 + αxn
W 1n(ω) +
1
1 + αxn
W 0n(ω)
)}
= 0. (5)
We further obtain the complementary slackness condition for xn(ω):
− 1 + β α
(1 + αxn)2
(
W 1n(ω)−W 0n(ω)
) ≤ 0,
xn
(
−1 + β α
(1 + αxn)2
(
W 1n(ω)−W 0n(ω)
))
= 0, (6)
xn ≥ 0.
Suppose next that ﬁrm n is a potential entrant, i.e., ωn = 0. The value function
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Vn : {0} × {0, . . . ,M} → R is implicitly deﬁned by
Vn(ω) = max
ξn∈[0,1]
ξn
{−E{φen|φen ≤ F e−1(ξn)}+ βW en(ω)} . (7)
Note that an optimizing potential entrant cares about the expectation of the setup cost
conditional on entering,
E
{
φen|φen ≤ F e−1(ξn)
}
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ¯−  if T en = −1,
φ¯ + 
(−1+3T en2+2T en3
3((1+T en)
2)
)
if −1 < T en < 0,
φ¯ + 
(−1+3T en2−2T en3
3(2−(1−T en)2)
)
if 0 ≤ T en < 1,
φ¯ if T en = 1,
where
T en ≡
1

[
F e−1(ξn)− φ¯
]
,
rather than its unconditional expectation E(φen). Wn(ω) is the expectation of potential
entrant n’s value function as given by
W en(ω) =
∑
η∈{0,1}
δη(1− δ)1−η
[
1(ω−n = 0)ξ−n(ω)Vn(ωe − η, ωe − η) +
1(ω−n > 0)
[
ξ−n(ω)
∑
ν−n∈{0,1}
(
αx−n(ω)
1+αx−n(ω)
)ν−n (
1
1+αx−n(ω)
)1−ν−n
×Vn
(
ωe − η,max {min {ω−n + ν−n − η,M} , 1}
)]
+(1− ξn(ω))Vn(ωe − η, 0)
]
. (8)
Using the fact that −ξnE
{
φen|φen ≤ F e−1(ξn)
}
= − ∫φen≤F e−1(ξn) φendF e(φen), we obtain the
ﬁrst-order condition for ξn:
− F−1(ξn) + βW en(ω) = 0. (9)
Equilibrium. We restrict attention to symmetric Markov perfect equilibria in pure strate-
gies. Proposition 3 in Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2009) establishes that such an equilib-
rium always exists. In a symmetric equilibrium, the investment decision taken by ﬁrm
2 in state ω is identical to the investment decision taken by ﬁrm 1 in state ω[2], i.e.,
x2(ω) = x1(ω[2]), and similarly for the entry/exit decisions, and the value functions. It
therefore suﬃces to determine the value and policy functions of ﬁrm 1, and we deﬁne
V (ω) = V1(ω), ξ(ω) = ξ1(ω), and x(ω) = x1(ω) for each state ω. Similarly, we deﬁne
W τ1(ω) = W τ11 (ω) and W
e(ω) = W e1 (ω) for each state ω. Solving for an equilibrium for a
particular parameterization of the model amounts to ﬁnding a value function V(·) and pol-
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icy functions ξ(·) and x(·) that satisfy the Bellman equations (3) and (7) and the optimality
conditions (5), (6), and (9).
3 Computation
Our objective is to compute equilibria of the model using the homotopy method. In sub-
section 3.1, we present the theory of the homotopy method. In subection 3.2, we discuss
HOMPACK90, a suite of Fortran90 routines developed by Watson et al. (1997) that imple-
ments this method. In subsection 3.3, we explain how we apply this method to the quality
ladder model.
3.1 The Homotopy Method
The homotopy method attempts to describe the equilibrium correspondence that maps
model parameters into equilibria in a tractable manner. First, it represents the system
of nonlinear equations that characterizes the equilibrium correspondence as a collection of
smooth paths.3 Second, it characterizes these paths using a system of ordinary diﬀerential
equations. An implementation of the method – a homotopy algorithm – can be used to
trace out the paths by numerically solving this system. As such, a homotopy algorithm
can be used to explore an equilibrium correspondence in a systematic fashion; starting from
a single equilibrium that has already been computed for a given parameterization of the
model, a homotopy algorithm traces out an entire path of equilibria by varying a parameter
of interest. It is therefore especially useful in searching for multiple equilibria.
The equilibrium conditions depend on the parameterization of the model. Making this
dependence explicit, the equilibrium conditions can be written as
H (z, λ) = 0, (10)
where H : RN+1 → RN , z ∈ RN is the vector of the unknown values and policies, 0 ∈ RN
is a vector of zeros, and λ ∈ [0, 1] is the so-called homotopy parameter. We use boldface
to distinguish between vectors and scalars. Depending on the application at hand, the
homotopy parameter maps into one or more of the parameters of the model. The object of
interest in the equilibrium correspondence
H−1 = {(z, λ)|H(z, λ) = 0} .
A homotopy algorithm aims to trace out entire paths of equilibria in H−1. This allows us
to understand how equilibrium behavior changes as we move through the parameter space.
3In subsection 3.3, we explain how to formulate the equilibrium conditions as a system of equations.
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Figure 1: Example.
Example. We use a simple example to explain how the homotopy method describes the
solution set. Let N = 1 and consider the equation H(z, λ) = 0 that relates a variable z
with a parameter λ, where
H(z, λ) = z3 − z + 1− 2λ.
Here we do not use boldface for z and 0 since they are scalars. The set of solutions is
H−1 = {(z, λ)|H(z, λ) = 0} and is shown in Figure 1. Inspecting Figure 1, one can easily
see that multiple solutions arise whenever the graph bends back on itself, as it does at
points B and C. For example, at λ = 0.5 there are three solutions, namely z = −1, z = 0,
and z = 1. Thus the mapping from λ to z is a correspondence and cannot be described by
a function.
The homotopy method constructs a parametric path (z(s), λ(s)) ∈ H−1 through the set
of solutions. The points on this path are indexed by the auxiliary variable s that increases
or decreases monotonically as we move along the path. To construct the parametric path,
we proceed as follows. As (z(s), λ(s)) ∈ H−1, it follows that H(z(s), λ(s)) = 0 for all s.
Totally diﬀerentiating with respect to s yields the condition for remaining on the path:
∂H(z(s), λ(s))
∂z
z′(s) +
∂H(z(s), λ(s))
∂λ
λ′(s) = 0. (11)
As this is one diﬀerential equation in two unknowns, z′(s) and λ′(s), it has many solutions;
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however, they all describe the same path in H−1. One obvious solution is
z′(s) =
∂H(z(s), λ(s))
∂λ
= −2, (12)
λ′(s) = −∂H(z(s), λ(s))
∂z
= −3z2 + 1. (13)
The so-called basic diﬀerential equations (BDE) (12) and (13) and the initial condition
H(γ, 0) = 0 (14)
where
γ = −(108 + 12
√
69)2/3 + 12
6(108 + 12
√
69)1/3
. (15)
describe the parametric path (z(s), λ(s)) ∈ H−1 given by
z (s) = −2s + γ, (16)
λ (s) = −3s(−2s + γ)2 + s. (17)
While this simple example allows for an analytic solution to the BDE, most real-world
problems do not; therefore, numerical methods are typically used to solve the BDE.
A homotopy algorithm traces out the parametric path (z(s), λ(s)) ∈ H−1 by computing
a sequence of points on the path. The unique solution to H(z, λ) = 0 when λ = 0 is z = γ.
This provides the homotopy algorithm with a starting point (point A in Figure 1). From
there the algorithm uses the basic diﬀerential equations (12) and (13) to determine the
direction in which it should proceed to ﬁnd the next point on the path. It continues in this
manner until it reaches λ = 1 (point D).
We can now proceed with the general case as we did in the example. Recall that the
object of interest is the equilibrium correspondence H−1 = {(z, λ)|H(z, λ) = 0}. We deﬁne
the parametric path (z(s), λ(s)) ∈ H−1. Totally diﬀerentiating H(z(s), λ(s)) = 0 with
respect to s yields
∂H(z(s), λ(s))
∂z
z′(s) +
∂H(z(s), λ(s))
∂λ
λ′(s) = 0,
where ∂H(z(s),λ(s))∂z is the (N × N) Jacobian of H with respect to z, z′(s) and ∂H(z(s),λ(s))∂λ
are (N × 1) vectors, and λ′(s) is a scalar. This is a system of N diﬀerential equations in
N + 1 unknowns, z′i(s), i = 1, . . . , N , and λ
′(s). Zangwill & Garcia (1981) show that this
system has a solution that satisﬁes the basic diﬀerential equations
y′i(s) = (−1)i+1 det
([
∂H(y(s))
∂y
]
−i
)
, i = 1, . . . , N + 1, (18)
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where y(s) = (z(s), λ(s)), and the notation [·]−i is used to indicate that the ith column is
removed from the (N × (N + 1)) Jacobian ∂H(y(s))∂y of H with respect to y (see pp. 27-28).
Note that equations (12) and (13) are the basic diﬀerential equations (18) for the special
case of N = 1.
Regularity and smoothness requirements. A closer inspection of the basic diﬀerential
equations (18) reveals a potential diﬃculty. If the Jacobian ∂H(y(s))∂y is not of full rank at
some point y(s) on the solution path, then the determinant of each of its square submatrices
is zero. Thus, according to the basic diﬀerential equations (18), y′i(s) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N +1;
the fact that the system of diﬀerential equations is underdetermined presents a problem for a
homotopy algorithm that exploits the basic diﬀerential equations to determine the direction
in which to proceed, as they are uninformative at such a point. A central condition in the
mathematical literature on the homotopy method is thus that the Jacobian must have full
rank at all points on the solution path. If so, the homotopy is called regular. More formally,
H is regular if rank
(
∂H(y)
∂y
)
= N for all y ∈ H−1.
The other major requirement of the homotopy method is smoothness in the sense of
diﬀerentiability. This yields solution paths that are smooth and free of sudden turns or
kinks. Formally, if H is continuously diﬀerentiable in addition to regular, then the set
of solutions H−1 consists only of continuously diﬀerentiable paths. This result is known
as the path theorem and essentially follows from the implicit function theorem (see, e.g.,
p. 20 of Zangwill & Garcia 1981). Moreover, for a path to be described by the basic
diﬀerential equations (18) it must be the case that H is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in
addition to regular. This result is known as the BDE theorem (see pp. 27–28 of Zangwill
& Garcia 1981).
If the regularity and smoothness requirements are satisﬁed, the solution setH−1 consists
only of smooth paths that can be easily traversed by a homotopy algorithm. In particular,
the solution set H−1 consists only of paths that start at λ = 0 and end at λ = 1; paths
that start and end at λ = 0 or λ = 1; loops; and paths that start at λ = 0 or λ = 1 but
never end because z (or a component of z in the case of a vector) tends to +∞ or −∞.
Regularity allows us to rule out isolated equilibria, pitchfork bifurcations, inﬁnite spirals,
and paths that suddenly terminate. See Section 2 of Borkovsky et al. (2008) for illustrative
ﬁgures and further details.
In practice, it is often hard to establish regularity because the Jacobian of a system
of equations that characterizes the equilibria of a dynamic stochastic game formulated in
the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework tends to be intractable. This stems partly from
the fact that the Jacobian for such a system is typically quite large because the system
includes at least two equations (Bellman equation and optimality condition) for each state
of the industry, and even “small” models with few ﬁrms and few states per ﬁrm tend to
have hundreds of industry states. The smoothness requirement can often be satisﬁed by a
judicious choice of functional forms.
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Recall that in Section 2 we assume that scrap values and setup costs are drawn from
triangular distributions; the resulting cumulative distribution functions are once but not
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, contrary to the smoothness requirement. We nevertheless
did not encounter a problem. If a problem is encountered in another application, we suggest
using a Beta(k, k) distribution with k ≥ 3 to ensure that the system of equations is at least
twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
3.2 HOMPACK90 Software Package
HOMPACK90 is a suite of Fortran90 routines that traces out a path in H−1.4 In order
to use HOMPACK90, ﬁrst, the user must provide Fortran90 code that returns H(z, λ) at
a given point (z, λ). Second, the user must provide a routine that returns the Jacobian
of H at a given point (z, λ). Many applications yield Jacobians with relatively few non-
zeros elements; such a Jacobian is called sparse and HOMPACK90 allows the user to store
such a Jacobian using a sparse-matrix storage format. This can substantially decrease
computation time; however, in order to use this format, the user must specify the “sparsity
structure” of the Jacobian, i.e., the row and column indices of potentially non-zero elements.
The Jacobian can be computed either numerically (see, e.g., Chapter 7 of Judd 1998)
or analytically. We compute the Jacobian analytically using ADIFOR, a program that
analytically diﬀerentiates Fortran code. ADIFOR is described in Bischof, Khademi, Mauer
& Carle (1996). Third, the user must provide an initial condition in the form of a solution
to the system of equations for the particular parameterization associated with λ = 0. In
some cases, if the parameterization associated with λ = 0 is trivial, the solution can be
derived analytically. More generally, a solution for a particular parameterization can be
computed numerically using a number of approaches such as Gaussian methods including
(but not limited to) the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm, other nonlinear solvers (see
Ferris et al. 2007), and artiﬁcial homotopies (see Borkovsky et al. 2008). Borkovsky et al.
(2008) discuss the three inputs as well as a number of potential problems with HOMPACK90
in detail. A technical description of HOMPACK90 is given in Watson, Billups & Morgan
(1987) and Watson et al. (1997).
3.3 Application to Quality Ladder Model
As explained above, the homotopy method operates on a system of equations. However,
given the non-negativity constraint on investment, the problem that an incumbent ﬁrm
has to solve is formulated using a complementary slackness condition, a combination of
4There are other software packages that can be used to solve systems of equations using the homotopy
method. For example, with the freely-available Gambit (McKelvey, McLennan & Turocy 2006) and PHCpack
(Verschelde 1999) software packages, one can use the homotopy method to obtain solutions to polynomial
systems; these algorithms exploit the structure of a polynomial system, in particular its sparsity structure.
We use HOMPACK90 because it does not impose any restrictions on the functional form of the system of
equations or the sparsity structure of the Jacobian.
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equalities and inequalities, rather than a ﬁrst-order condition, an equation. Fortunately,
Zangwill & Garcia (1981) oﬀer a reformulation of the complementary slackness condition
that consists entirely of equations that are continuously diﬀerentiable to an arbitrary degree
(see pp. 65–68).
Consider the complementary slackness condition (6). Using the fact that we focus on
symmetric equilibria in order to eliminate ﬁrm indices and multiplying through by (1 +
αx(ω))2 to simplify the expressions that arise in what follows, the complementary slackness
condition (6) can be restated as
− (1 + αx(ω))2 + βα (W 1(ω)−W 0(ω)) ≤ 0,
x(ω)
(−(1 + αx(ω)2 + βα (W 1(ω)−W 0(ω))) = 0, (19)
x(ω) ≥ 0.
Now introduce another scalar variable ζ(ω) and consider the system of equations
− (1 + αx(ω))2 + βα (W 1(ω)−W 0(ω))+ [max {0, ζ(ω)}]k = 0, (20)
−x(ω) + [max {0,−ζ(ω)}]k = 0, (21)
where k ∈ N. It is easy to see that the system of equations (20) and (21) is equivalent to
the complementary slackness condition (19).5 This system is (k − 1) times continuously
diﬀerentiable with respect to ζ(ω). Hence, by choosing k large enough, we can satisfy
the smoothness requirement of the homotopy method. The terms [max {0, ζ(ω)}]k and
[max {0,−ζ(ω)}]k serve as slack variables that ensure that the inequalities in (19) are sat-
isﬁed and the fact that [max {0, ζ(ω)}]k [max {0,−ζ(ω)}]k = 0 ensures that the equality in
(19) holds.
We could now proceed to deﬁne the system of homotopy equations using equations
(20) and (21), the incumbent’s Bellman equation in (3) and the ﬁrst-order condition for
ξ(ω) in (5) for ω ∈ {1, . . . ,M} × {0, . . . ,M}, and the entrant’s Bellman equation in (7)
and the ﬁrst-order condition for ξ(ω) in (9) for ω ∈{0} × {0, . . . ,M}.6 This would yield a
system of 2(M +1)(2M + 1) equations in the 2(M + 1)(2M +1) unknowns V (ω) and ξ(ω)
for ω ∈ {0, ...,M}2 , and x(ω) and ζ(ω) for ω ∈ {1, . . . ,M} × {0, . . . ,M}. However, two
problems arise: First, because we have added the slack variables, this system of equations
is relatively large with 2(M +1)(2M +1) equations and unknowns. This leads to increased
5From equations (20) and (21) it follows that
ζ(ω) =
⎧⎨
⎩
[(1 + αx(ω))2 + βα
(
W 1(ω)−W 0(ω))]1/k if −(1 + αx(ω))2 + βα (W 1(ω)−W 0(ω)) < 0,
−[x (ω)]1/k if x (ω) > 0,
0 if −(1 + αx(ω))2 + βα (W 1(ω)−W 0(ω)) = x (ω) = 0.
(22)
The claim now follows from the solution for ζ(ω) in equation (22) and the fact
max {0,−ζ(ω)}max {0, ζ(ω)} = 0.
6To be precise, we would substitute the equilibrium entry/exit policy ξ(ω) for ξn in (3) and (7), and the
equilibrium investment policy x(ω) for xn in (3); accordingly, we would remove the max operators.
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memory requirements and computation time. Second, this system of equations yields an
extremely sparse Jacobian, and we have found that this tends to cause HOMPACK90’s
sparse linear equation solver to fail; this is discussed further in Borkovsky et al. (2008).
We address these problems by solving equation (21) for x(ω),
x(ω) = [max {0,−ζ(ω)}]k , (23)
and then substituting this into equations (3), (5), (7), (9), and (20). This reduces the system
of 2(M + 1)(2M + 1) equations in 2(M + 1)(2M + 1) unknowns by M(M + 1) equations
and unknowns, respectively, to a system of (M +1)(3M +2) equations in (M +1)(3M +2)
unknowns. Moreover, it eliminates excessive sparsity.
To this end, deﬁne the vector of unknowns in equilibrium as
z = [V (0, 0) , V (1, 0) , . . . , V (M, 0) , V (0, 1), . . . , V (M,M),
ξ(0, 0), ..., ξ(M,M), ζ(1, 0), . . . , ζ(M,M)] .
The equations comprise
H1ω (z, λ) = −V (ω) + π1(ω) + (1− ξ(ω))E
{
φn|φn ≥ F−1(ξ(ω))
}
+ξ(ω)
{
−x(ω) + β
(
αx(ω)
1 + αx(ω)
W 1(ω) +
1
1 + αx(ω)
W 0(ω)
)}
= 0, (24)
H2ω (z, λ) = −F−1(ξ(ω)) +
{
−x(ω) + β
(
αx(ω)
1 + αx(ω)
W 1(ω) +
1
1 + αx(ω)
W 0(ω)
)}
= 0,
(25)
H3ω (z, λ) = −(1 + αx(ω))2 + βα
(
W 1(ω)−W 0(ω)) + [max {0, ζ(ω)}]k = 0 (26)
for states ω ∈{1, . . . ,M} × {0, . . . ,M}, and
H1ω (z, λ) = −V (ω) + ξ(ω)
{−E{φe1|φe1 ≤ F e−1(ξ(ω))}+ βW e(ω)} = 0, (27)
H2ω (z, λ) = −F−1(ξ(ω)) + βW e(ω) = 0 (28)
for states ω ∈{0} × {0, . . . ,M}, where we substitute for W τ1(ω) using the deﬁnition in
(4), for W e(ω) using the deﬁnition in (8), and for x(ω) using (23). Note that (24), (25),
(26), (27), and (28) are equations that are used to construct the system of homotopy
equations, while (4), (8), and (23) are simply deﬁnitional shorthands for terms that appear
in the aforementioned equations. The collection of equations (24), (25), and (26) for states
ω ∈{1, . . . ,M}×{0, . . . ,M}, and (27) and (28) for states ω ∈{0}×{0, . . . ,M} can be written
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parameter M m c ω∗ β α δ φ¯ φ¯e  ωe
value 18 5 5 12 0.925 3 0.7 3 1 1 4
Table 1: Parameter values.
more compactly as
H (z, λ) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
H1(0,0) (z, λ)
H1(1,0) (z, λ)
...
H3(M,M) (z, λ)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ = 0, (29)
where 0 ∈ R(M+1)(3M+2) is a vector of zeros. Any solution to this system of (M+1)(3M+2)
equations in (M + 1)(3M + 2) unknowns, z ∈ R(M+1)(3M+2), is a symmetric equilibrium in
pure strategies (for a given value of λ ∈ [0, 1]). The equilibrium investment decision x(ω) in
state ω is recovered by substituting the equilibrium slack variable ζ(ω) into deﬁnition (23).
Parameterization. The baseline parameterization is presented in Table 1 and is identical
to the parameterization explored in Pakes & McGuire (1994) except that we assume higher
setup costs and scrap values than Pakes & McGuire (1994). The reason is that we are
interested in studying an industry that can support up to two active ﬁrms, while they
study an industry that can support up to six active ﬁrms.
As explained above, the homotopy algorithm traces out an entire path of equilibria by
varying one or more parameters of interest. We allow β, α, δ, φ¯ and φ¯e to vary, while
holding the remaining parameters ﬁxed at the baseline values. As such, we make the vector
comprising β, α, δ, φ¯ and φ¯e a function of the homotopy parameter λ:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
β(λ)
α(λ)
δ(λ)
φ¯(λ)
φ¯e(λ)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
βstart
αstart
δstart
φ¯start
φ¯e
start
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+ λ
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
βend − βstart
αend − αstart
δend − δstart
φ¯end − φ¯start
φ¯e
end − φ¯estart
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (30)
For example, if δstart = 0 and δend = 1 while βstart = βend, αstart = αend, φ¯start = φ¯end, and
φ¯e
start
= φ¯e
end
, then the homotopy algorithm traces out the equilibrium correspondence
from δ(0) = 0 to δ(1) = 1, holding all other parameter values ﬁxed. Setting diﬀerent
starting and ending values for one or more of these parameters allows us to explore the set
of equilibria by moving through the parameter space in various directions. In general, given
any starting and ending values for the parameter vector, the homotopy algorithm can trace
out an entire path of equilibria by moving along the line in parameter space that connects
the starting and ending values.
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Figure 2: Proﬁt function π1(ω). (Blue = incumbent monopolist; red = potential entrant;
green = two potential entrants.)
Code. A set of code that allows the user to compute equilibria of the quality ladder model
using the homotopy method is available on the authors’ homepages. It includes (i) Matlab
code that implements the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm that we use to compute a
starting point for the homotopy algorithm; (ii) Fortran90 code that includes HOMPACK90
and the implementation of the quality ladder model; and (iii) additional Matlab code that
analyzes the output of the homotopy algorithm. More detailed information is included
within the code itself.
4 Equilibrium Behavior and Industry Dynamics
Equilibrium behavior is driven by the beneﬁts and costs of product quality. The beneﬁts
of product quality stem from the product market; a higher product quality yields a higher
market share and, accordingly, higher proﬁts. We begin by examining ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function
in Figure 2 more closely; as ﬁrms are symmetric, ﬁrm 2 faces a symmetric proﬁt function.
The proﬁt function of an incumbent monopolist is plotted in blue along the ω1 axis. The
proﬁt function of a potential entrant facing an incumbent monopolist is plotted in red
along the ω2 axis. The proﬁt of a potential entrant facing an empty industry is plotted
in green over state (0, 0). The proﬁt function of an incumbent duopolist is graphed over
the remainder of the state space. If an incumbent duopolist has a higher (lower) quality
product than its rival, we refer to it as the leader (follower). In Figure 2, the proﬁt function
is relatively ﬂat for the follower (ω1 < ω2) and relatively steep for the leader (ω1 > ω2);
i.e., while a follower can increase its proﬁt relatively little by increasing its product quality,
a leader can increase its proﬁt signiﬁcantly by increasing its product quality.7 This stems
from the fact that ﬁrms face the Logit demand function (2) and, accordingly, an increase
in the leader’s product quality enhances its demand more than an increase in the follower’s
product quality enhances its demand (until decreasing returns to quality set in).
7A ﬁrm’s proﬁt function ﬂattens out as its quality exceeds ω∗ = 12 because of the decreasing returns to
quality that set in.
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Figure 3: Policy functions x(ω) (left column) and ξ(ω) (right column). (Blue = incumbent
monopolist; red = potential entrant; green = two potential entrants.)
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Figure 4: Transient distributions over states in periods 10 (left column) and 1000 (right
column) given initial state (4,4).
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Product quality is costly in the sense that an incumbent ﬁrm must invest in order to
maintain or enhance it. One parameter that aﬀects this cost is the rate of depreciation δ.
An increase in the depreciation rate makes it more costly for an incumbent ﬁrm to maintain
or increase its product quality; i.e., an incumbent ﬁrm needs to invest more in order to oﬀset
the higher rate at which its product quality decreases. It follows that a higher depreciation
rate makes it more costly for a follwer to catch up to or overtake a leader.
To see how the beneﬁts and costs of product quality aﬀect equilibrium behavior and in-
dustry dynamics, we present equilibria for various values of δ – in particular δ ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.6., 0.7}.
The equilibrium investment and entry/exit policy functions are graphed in Figure 3 in the
left and right columns, respectively. The investment and exit policy functions of an in-
cumbent monopolist are graphed in blue along the ω1 axis. The entry policy function of
a potential entrant facing an incumbent monopolist is graphed in red along the ω2 axis.
The entry policy function of a potential entrant facing an empty industry is graphed in
green over state (0, 0). The surfaces graphed over the remainder of the state space are the
investment and exit policy functions of an incumbent duopolist.
For higher rates of depreciation, a follower that falls suﬃciently far behind ceases to
invest and exits with positive probability; this can be seen in the subsets of the state space
that lie along the ω2 axis in the policy functions for δ ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7}. A follower in this
subset of the state space faces little incentive to invest in order to increase its proﬁt in
the imminent future because the proﬁt function is quite ﬂat in this subset (see Figure 2).
Furthermore, the follower determines that it is too costly to invest in catching up with
the leader, given the high rate of depreciation. Not surprisingly, the higher the rate of
depreciation, the larger the subset in which the follower ceases to invest and exits with
positive probability; in other words, the higher the depreciation rate, the smaller the lead
required to induce the follower to give up. The subset of the state space in which the follower
ceases to invest does not necessarily coincide with the subset of the state space in which it
exits with positive probability; this depends on the parameterization. Generally speaking,
increasing the rate of depreciation causes both of these subsets to grow as they do in Figure
3. So, for a suﬃciently high rate of depreciation, an incumbent ﬁrm that falls suﬃciently
far behind both ceases to invest and exits with positive probability.
The leader exploits these incentives by striving to move the industry state into the subset
of the state space in which the follower gives up. This can be seen in the policy functions
for δ ∈ {0.6, 0.7}; the leader invests heavily in the states adjacent to the subset in which the
follower gives up. Once in this subset, the leader best responds to its rivals zero investment
and imminent exit by signiﬁcantly decreasing its investment.
We also explore the implications of the equilibrium behavior for industry dynamics,
both in the short run and in the long run. We compute the transient distribution over
states in period t, μt (·) , starting from state (ωe, ωe) = (4, 4) in period 0. This tells us how
likely each possible industry structure is in period t, given that both ﬁrms began with the
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exogenous initial product quality. Figures 4 displays the transient distributions in periods
10 and 1000, respectively. We use a transient distribution in period 1000 – instead of
an ergodic distribution – to reﬂect the long-run industry structure because there may be
several closed communicating classes.8 When δ = 0.5, a follower that falls suﬃciently far
behind ceases to invest and exits; however, the long-run industry structure is nevertheless
symmetric. This is because an incumbent that exits is ultimately replaced by a potential
entrant. The transient distributions in Figure 4 show that when the rate of depreciation is
suﬃciently high, the industry structure will ultimately become asymmetric; the incumbent
ﬁrm that becomes the leader is very likely to induce its rival to stop investing and exit and
thus it ultimately becomes an incumbent monopolist.
Varying other parameters of the model causes equilibrium behavior to change in a similar
way – in particular, decreasing the eﬀectiveness of investment, decreasing the market size,
or increasing the marginal cost of production.9 More generally, we ﬁnd that a change in
parameterization that increases (decreases) the cost (beneﬁt) of achieving or maintaining
any given product quality aﬀects behavior in the same manner as an increase in the rate of
depreciation and yields more asymmetric industry structures in the short and long run.
5 Predatory and Limit Investment
In this section, we explore the eﬀects of entry and exit on equilibrium investment behavior in
more detail. In particular, we discuss predatory and limit investment. Predatory and limit
investment are most pronounced when an incumbent ﬁrm has an incentive to induce exit
and prevent entry, respectively. This behavior is less apparent (but present) in the equilibria
presented in the previous section because a follower that falls suﬃciently far behind is priced
out of the market. We can see this by comparing the proﬁt function of a monopolist to
the proﬁt function of a duopolist facing a rival in state 1; the maximum absolute diﬀerence
between the functions is 0.028 (for quality levels 13-18), and the maximum relative diﬀerence
is 0.66% (for quality level 1). Therefore, to an incumbent, it makes little diﬀerence whether
it is facing a potential entrant or an incumbent ﬁrm with a very low quality product.
To get an unobstructed view of predatory and limit investment, we explore a diﬀerent
parameterization of the product market game – one that gives the follower a higher equi-
librium market share in each state, so that it is not priced out of the market. We simply
increase the vertical intercept and decrease the slope of the function that maps product
8A closed communicating class is a subset of states that the industry never leaves once it has entered it.
When there are multiple closed communicating classes, one cannot compute a single ergodic distribution;
rather, one must compute a separate ergodic distribution for each closed communicating class. The tran-
sient distribution that we compute instead accounts for the probability of reaching any one of the closed
communicating classes. In addition, given a discount factor of β = 0.925 we take a period to be one year;
therefore, anything that happens beyond a certain point in time may be considered economically irrelevant.
9Although we have not explored the eﬀects of changing period game parameters – such as the market size
and the marginal cost of production – on equilibrium behavior using the homotopy method (see equation
30), we have done so using the Pakes & McGuire (1994) algorithm.
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quality into the consumer’s valuation of it by replacing g(·) as deﬁned in (1) with
g(ωn) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
−∞ if ωn = 0
6 + 12ωn if 1 ≤ ωn ≤ ω∗,
6 + 12ω
∗ + ln (2− exp (ω∗ − ωn)) if ω∗ < ωn ≤ M.
For this parameterization, the diﬀerence between the proﬁt function of a monopolist facing
a potential entrant and the proﬁt function of a duopolist facing an incumbent ﬁrm in state
1 varies from 1.331 (in state 1) to 3.701 (in state 18) in absolute terms and from 17.10%
(in state 18) to 53.25% (in state 1) in relative terms. It follows that an incumbent ﬁrm
has a very strong incentive to become a monopolist as opposed to a duopolist, no matter
how dominant a duopolist it can be. Having given the follower a higher equilibrium market
share, we must also increase the setup costs and scrap values; otherwise, incumbent ﬁrms
would never exit and potential entrants would always enter.
Predatory investment. We assess whether ﬁrms engage in predatory investment using
the deﬁnition inspired by Ordover & Willig (1981). According to their deﬁnition, an action
is predatory if it is optimal when taking into consideration its eﬀect on the likelihood that
a rival exits, but suboptimal otherwise. Therefore, predation can be studied by comparing
ﬁrms’ policies in two scenarios: in the baseline scenario, scrap values are set to moderate
values so that exit is possible but not certain and setup costs are set to values high enough
to ensure that entry never occurs (φ¯ = 20, φ¯e = ∞); the counterfactual scenario diﬀers
from the baseline scenario only in that the scrap values are set to such low values that the
incumbents never exit (φ¯ = −3, φ¯e = ∞). Policy functions for the baseline scenario are
presented in the top row of Figure 5. Policy functions for the counterfactual scenario are
presented in the middle row of Figure 5. By comparing the investment policy functions, we
see exactly how the opportunity to induce exit and become a perpetual monopolist aﬀects
an incumbent duopolist’s investment incentives. In the bottom row of Figure 5, we present
the diﬀerence between the investment policy functions for the two scenarios.
In the diﬀerence between investment policy functions, we see a pronounced ridge that
is adjacent to the subset of the state space in which the follower ceases investing and exits
with positive probability. This demonstrates that in the baseline scenario, a ﬁrm invests
signiﬁcantly more than in the counterfactual scenario once it gains a small lead and is in
a position to induce its rival to give up. According to the above deﬁnition, this additional
investment is predatory.
In this model, predation occurs in a complete information setting amongst ex-ante sym-
metric ﬁrms. In the earliest papers in this literature, equilibrium predation was driven by
asymmetric information and asymmetries amongst ﬁrms (Milgrom & Roberts 1982, Selten
1978). We contribute to the later stream of the literature that shows that equilibrium pre-
dation can occur in the presence of complete information and/or symmetric ﬁrms (Cabral
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Figure 5: Predatory investment. Baseline scenario policy functions x(ω) (left column) and
ξ(ω) (right column) for φ¯ = 20 and φ¯e = ∞ (top row). Counterfactual scenario policy
functions xCF (ω) and ξCF (ω) for φ¯ = −3 and φ¯e = ∞ (middle row). Diﬀerence between
investment policy functions (bottom row).
& Riordan 1994, Cabral & Riordan 1997, Snider 2008).
Limit investment. We adopt a deﬁnition of limit investment analogous to the deﬁnition
of predatory investment that Ordover & Willig (1981) inspire; i.e., limit investment occurs
when a ﬁrm that is threatened with entry invests more than it would have had it not been
threatened with entry. In order to assess whether an incumbent monopolist engages in limit
investment, we compare two scenarios: the baseline scenario includes setup costs from an
intermediate range that induce a potential entrant to enter in only some states, and scrap
values set to such low values that incumbents never exit (φ¯ = −3, φ¯e = 22); the counter-
factual scenario diﬀers from the baseline scenario only in that it includes prohibitively high
setup costs that induce the potential entrant to refrain from entering in all states (φ¯ = −3,
φ¯e =∞). By comparing these scenarios, we see exactly how the opportunity to prevent en-
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Figure 6: Limit investment. Baseline scenario policy functions x(ω1, 0) (left column) and
ξ(0, ω2) (right column) for φ¯ = −3 and φ¯e = 22 (top row). Counterfactual scenario policy
functions xCF (ω1, 0) and ξCF (0, ω2) for φ¯ = −3 and φ¯e = ∞ (middle row). Diﬀerence
between investment policy functions (bottom row).
try and thus prevent the industry from becoming a perpetual duopoly aﬀects an incumbent
monopolist’s investment incentives. The incumbent monopolist’s investment policy func-
tion and the potential entrant’s entry policy function for the baseline scenario are presented
in the top row of Figure 6. The analogous policy functions for the counterfactual scenario
are presented in the middle row of Figure 6. By comparing the incumbent monopolist’s
investment policy functions, we see exactly how the opportunity to prevent entry aﬀects its
investment incentives. In the bottom row of Figure 6, we present the diﬀerence between
the investment policy functions for the two scenarios. As Figure 6 shows, in the baseline
scenario, the potential entrant enters if the incumbent monopolist’s quality is suﬃciently
low (ω2 ≤ 5) and does not enter otherwise. Limit investment can be seen in state (5) and
neighbouring states, where the incumbent monopolist signiﬁcantly increases its investment,
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Figure 7: Policy functions for state (3, 0): entry/exit policy function (top panel); incumbent
ﬁrm’s investment policy function (bottom panel).
realizing that an increase in its quality will prevent the entrant from entering.
The Pakes & McGuire (1994) quality ladder model is perhaps the simplest model that
one could devise in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework. The fact that introducing entry
and exit into this model gives rise to predatory and limit investment therefore suggests that
such behaviors are quite pervasive in this framework.
6 Multiple Equilibria
Pakes & McGuire (1994) do not ﬁnd multiple equilibria of their quality ladder model; on
the basis of this, they reason that their quality ladder model does not admit multiple
equilibria (p. 570). However, in systematically exploring the equilibrium correspondence
of the above model using the homotopy method, we have uncovered several instances of
multiplicity. We have searched for multiplicity by allowing the homotopy algorithm to vary
several diﬀerent parameters; see equation (30). While all these searches have uncovered
instances of multiplicity, we focus on one speciﬁc case. We allow the homotopy algorithm
to vary φ¯ and φ¯e; for the baseline parameterization in Table 1, the algorithm traces out a
path of equilibria for φ¯e ∈ [0, 40] and φ¯ = φ¯e + 2.
In Figure 7, we show the ﬁrms’ policy functions for state (3, 0), where the diﬀerences
between equilibria are most prominent. Recall that when the incumbent ﬁrm is in state
(3,0), the potential entrant is in state (0,3); therefore, we graph the policy functions in
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Expected # of MPE A MPE B MPE C
Entering ﬁrms 0.055 0.034 0.016
Exiting ﬁrms 0.068 0.047 0.030
Active ﬁrms 1.126 1.142 1.138
Table 2: Summary statistics for period 10 given initial state (4, 4).
both of these states. These graphs show that the homotopy algorithm traces out a path
that bends back on itself, just as in the example in Figure 1, because the path includes an
S-shape in the interval [18.8, 22.3]. There are multiple equilibria for each parameterization
in this interval.
We will explore the three equilibria that arise at φ = 20 in more detail. (We do not
plot the policy functions for these equilibria because they are qualitatively similar to policy
functions presented earlier, in the bottom row of Figure 3.) All three equilibria lead to the
same asymmetric (monopolistic) long-run industry structure; for each, the modal states are
(15, 0) and (0, 15). This is not surprising: First, we have already seen that a qualitatively
similar equilibrium yields a very asymmetric long-run industry structure (see the bottom
row of Figure 4). Second, the policy functions of these three equilibria are virtually identical
near the modal states of the long-run industry structure, so we should not expect diﬀerences
to arise in the long run. However, due to the diﬀerences between the policy functions near
the origin and along the diagonal of the state space, diﬀerences in the short-run industry
structures do arise, as demonstrated by the summary statistics in Table 2.10 For each of
the three equilibria, Table 2 presents the expected number of entering, exiting, and active
ﬁrms in period 10, given that the industry starts from state (ωe, ωe) = (4, 4) in period 0.
While there is relatively little variation in the expected number of active ﬁrms across the
equilibria, there is greater variation in the expected number of entering and exiting ﬁrms;
both are highest for equilibrium number 1 and lowest for equilibrium number 3. That is,
there is a variation in churn across the equilibria; in equilibrium number 1 (3), ﬁrms enter
and exit more (less) often in the short run than in the other two equilibria.
Naturally, this churn is directly related to diﬀerences in entry and exit probabilities.
In the upper panel of Figure 7, we can see these probabilities for state (3, 0). We see
that a higher chance of the incumbent ﬁrm remaining in the industry is matched by a
lower entry probability of the potential entrant, and vice versa: in equilibrium A, the
incumbent ﬁrm remains in the industry with probability 0.0303 and the potential entrant
enters with probability 0.9748; in equilibrium B, the incumbent ﬁrm remains in the industry
with probability 0.6936 and the potential entrant enters with probability 0.4031; and in
equilibrium C, the incumbent ﬁrm remains in the industry with probability 1 and the
potential entrant enters with probability 0.1032. The incumbent most prefers equilibrium
10Equilibria A, B, and C arise in that order as the homotopy algorithm traces out the path from φ¯ = 0 to
φ¯ = 40.
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number 3 while the potential entrant most prefers equilibrium number 1; in equilibrium
number 3, the incumbent is likely to remain an incumbent monopolist, and in equilibrium
number 1, the potential entrant is likely to become an incumbent monopolist. Equilibrium
behavior of this nature arises in static normal-form coordination games such as “Battle of
the Sexes” (see pp. 18–20 of Fudenberg & Tirole 1991).
All other instances of multiplicity that we have uncovered are qualitatively similar in
that the diﬀerences between policy functions are similar to those described above. Despite
this, we have found multiple equilibria that lead to slight diﬀerences in industry structure
that persist in the long run; while one equilibrium leads to an extremely symmetric industry
structure in which ﬁrms are tied, another leads to a slightly asymmetric industry structure
in which one ﬁrm leads the other by only one quality level. In sum, while we have found
multiplicity in the Pakes & McGuire (1994) quality ladder model, it is hardly as dramatic
as in other models (Besanko et al. 2009, Besanko et al. 2008); the diﬀerences in equilibria
tend to be small and may matter little in practice.
In a companion paper (see Borkovsky et al. 2008), we use the homotopy method to
explore a quality ladder model without entry and exit. Interestingly, in the model with
entry and exit, multiple equilibria arise for parameterizations for which we did not ﬁnd
multiple equilibria in the model without entry and exit. This suggests that entry and exit
may be a source of multiplicity in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework.
7 Concluding Remarks
We conduct the ﬁrst comprehensive exploration of the equilibrium correspondence of the
Pakes & McGuire (1994) quality ladder model. We uncover a variety of interesting equilib-
rium behavior and economic phenomena.
We ﬁnd that the industry structure that arises is determined by the cost and beneﬁt of
achieving or maintaining any given quality level. The more costly and/or less beneﬁcial it is
to achieve or maintain a given quality level, the more a leader invests in striving to induce
the follower to give up; the more quickly the follower does so; and the more asymmetric is
the industry structure that arises.
We also ﬁnd that equilibria in the Pakes & McGuire (1994) model are characterized
by predatory and limit investment. As the Pakes & McGuire (1994) model is a relatively
straightforward application of the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework, it is likely that such
behaviors arise is other models in this framework as well. It is also notable that predation
arises in a complete information setting amongst symmetric ﬁrms; in much of the earlier
literature (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts 1982, Fudenberg & Tirole 1986), predation was driven
by asymmetric information and/or asymmetries across ﬁrms.
Exploring the equilibrium correspondence using the homotopy method allows us to
systematically search for multiple equilibria. We ﬁnd several instances of multiplicity. Fur-
thermore, we ﬁnd multiple equilibria for parameterizations of the model for which we did
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not ﬁnd multiple equilibria in the model without entry and exit, suggesting that entry and
exit can be a source of multiplicity in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) framework.
Besides systematically exploring the equilibrium correspondence, the homotopy method
has other uses. First, a so-called artiﬁcial homotopy can be used to compute an equilibrium
for a particular parameterization; in principle, the resulting algorithm is free of convergence
problems (Watson et al. 1997, Borkovsky et al. 2008). All-solutions (artiﬁcial) homotopies
(McKelvey et al. 2006) have been used to solve for all solutions of static games (Bajari,
Hong & Ryan 2009) and may prove useful for dynamic stochastic games as well. Second,
Doraszelski & Escobar (2009) show that in dynamic stochastic games with a ﬁnite number
of states and actions, the homotopy method can be used to single out the equilibrium that
is likely to be played after a policy intervention. Third, the homotopy method could be
used in structural estimation of dynamic stochastic games; if all equilibria of a model can
be computed, then one can estimate an equilibrium selection rule along with the primitives
of the model (Bajari, Hahn, Hong & Ridder 2008, Bajari et al. 2009, Grieco 2009).
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